South Africa’s 2009 elections highlighted the dwindling influence of minority groups in government. SHARON GREEN examines how the bigger opposition parties are growing in stature and explains why the future of opposition politics is as easy to predict as it is to pick the winning number in roulette.

Is this it, the dawning of a new era of South African politics? Or were the results of the recent elections merely a minor blip on the radar that is a democracy characterised by the one-party dominance of the African National Congress (ANC)? The simple answer is that it is probably too early to tell. But it doesn’t mean that one cannot hope that the outcomes of the elections could be the start of something new.

Arguably the most significant upshots of the elections were the formation of the Congress of the People (COPE) and the Democratic Alliance’s (DA’s) majority takeover of the Western Cape. Despite the commotion and messy accusations that followed the latter event, the fact remains that it is the first province that the ANC has lost since coming to power in 1994. In addition to this, and directly linked to COPE and the DA’s performance, the 2009 election produced some significant figures regarding the smaller opposition parties and the proportional representation (PR) system which allows them to stay alive. PR creates opportunities for the representation of many diverse constituencies, but the generally accepted assumption is that, while minority cultural and political groups will be represented, the consequent fractured political environment inevitably leads to the formation of coalition governments, and thus to weak governance. But the latest elections may have nullified this concern.

HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS

In closed party lists (such as in South Africa) the identities of the party candidates are not made public and the political parties themselves are responsible for determining the ranking of candidates on the lists. The parties each list their candidates according to that party’s determination of priorities. In a closed list, voters vote for a list, not a candidate, as is done in the United States. Each party is allocated seats in proportion to the number of votes they receive, using the ranking order on its list. There is a minimum threshold of votes required to acquire a seat in parliament, and seats are allocated in near-direct proportion to votes received.

The system has been in place in South Africa since 1994, and has enabled particular minority factions the chance to be represented in government. The opportunity for minority inclusion is both a strength and a weakness of PR electoral systems. Although the inclusion of minority voices through the electoral system is good in theory, one reality of it is that it has effectively diluted opposition to the ruling party. The question of whether the role of these parties is dwindling into insignificance, or whether it’s an issue that has simply been over- hyped, can be looked at as a numbers game.

THE BIG GUYS STEP IN

The first step is to analyse to what extent the bigger political players have begun to dwarf the smaller players. As a result of the 2004 elections, just under 90% of the 400 seats in the National Assembly were held by only three political parties: the ANC with a clear two-thirds (279 seats), the DA with 50 seats and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) with 28 seats.

This election saw the ANC lose its two-thirds majority, as well as the entry of another party into the big league, as COPE claimed 30 seats. The DA expanded its parliamentary ranks by 17 seats and the IFP shrank to just 18. The implication of these numbers is that the key opposition to the ANC’s hegemonic status in the Assembly was increased from 78 seats held by two parties to 115 held by three. Even if, for argument’s sake, one insisted on excluding the IFP with the entirely justifiable argument regarding their degeneration, it still means that the top two opposition parties (numerically speaking) hold 97 seats between them – 19 more than in 2004.

Indeed, the IFP appears to be hanging on by a thread and fast approaching the murky depths of political oblivion. Mike Trapido, specialist criminal attorney, journalist and political commentator points out that the fact that the IFP was beaten in “their own backyard” is proof that they “cannot be considered a political player any more”.

WHEN PR SERVED THEM WELL

Following the 2004 elections, just over 10% of the National Assembly was divided among nine parties in the following order: the United Democratic Movement (UDM) with nine seats, the Independent Democrats (ID) and the New National Party (NNP) with seven each, the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) with six, the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) with four, United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) with three each, and finally Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and Minority Front (MF) with two seats each. With the exception of the NNP which dropped below the benchmark required to obtain a seat, those same parties occupy only 19 seats subsequent to the elections earlier this year.

The question is, is that all going to change now? Will those 19 seats between eight parties be whittled down to even fewer in the next elections? And if, for argument’s sake, COPE and the DA are the recipients of most of those transferred votes, will the creation of a competitive working opposition finally be realised? The significant decline of the role occupied by the smaller parties in the National Assembly complements the equally significant increase of the so-called ‘key political players’ in opposition – COPE and DA.

A “SUPER OPPOSITION”?

With respect to the splitting of opposition that the PR system inevitably causes, Patricia de Lille has suggested the possibility of a “super opposition”. Its viability, however, is debateable. Professor Roger Southall (of the Political Science Department at Rhodes University) wrote that “even though there is widespread acknowledgement of the case for mergers and coalitions to overcome the fragmentation of the opposition, the individual parties remain as divided as ever by the ambitions of their leaderships and their diverse constituencies”.

Likewise, Tony Leon, former leader of opposition party DA, expressed his opinion that by refusing Helen Zille’s offer to join her provincial government in the Western Cape, COPE “took a tactically decisive step on the vexed question of opposition realignment and future strategy”. Leon wrote that “[COPE] must have reasoned that a closer union with the DA could hinder its quest to make further inroads into the ANC vote across the country. That poses a challenge for the DA, and its realignment strategy, going forward. But, equally for COPE, the go-it-alone tactic, without the patronage of power or governance, could prove hard going”.

Perhaps this is the beginning of the rise of the opposition – the kick start they needed. Or, perhaps the ANC will reclaim both its two thirds majority and the rogue province in the 2014 elections. Only time will tell.

A final thought to ponder while considering this potential rise of the opposition, is the fact that this year’s elections occurred at a time of extreme disorder for the ruling party. The in-house fighting, unacceptable to a party whose structure is described by political analyst Marian Tupy as unequivocally Marxist, resulted in a major split, yet the ANC still did well in the elections. Effectively, it appears that the DA might only ever be able to close the gap on the ANC at election time to the extent that they did in April. In light of this, Trapido asks the question that many are too fearful to ask, “What will happen to the DA if the ANC has a good run in the next elections?”

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Sharon Green is in second-year, study­ing English Literature and Political Studies.